tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-74268992024-03-02T23:03:30.677+00:00Business AwarenessFoundations of Business Organizations and Management, viewed from economic, ethical, social, and systems-thinking perspectives.Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.comBlogger76125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-49307063092625414332019-06-11T23:29:00.000+01:002019-06-27T18:01:17.245+01:00Selected Reading List - Science and Technology StudiesHere are some books I never got to read when I was studying Computing Science at Imperial, plus some that were published after I graduated.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life (1984)<br />
<br />
Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women (1991) <br />
<br />
<span class="st">Larry Hirschhorn, Beyond Mechanization (1986)</span> <br />
<br />
Bruno Latour, Aramis, or the Love of Technology (1996) <br />
<br />
Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine (Vol 1 1967, Vol 2 1970)<br />
<br />
Mark Poster, The Mode of Information (1990)<br />
<br />
Dora Russell, The Religion of the Machine Age (1983)<br />
<br />
Lucy Suchman, Plans and Situated Actions (1987)<br />
<br />
Joseph Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason (1976) <br />
<br />
Norbert Wiener, Human Use of Human Beings (1950) <br />
<br />
<br />Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-17802745938859552122016-10-31T22:10:00.001+00:002017-02-04T20:13:41.676+00:00Weapons of Math DestructionCathy O’Neil, a data scientist and activist, has written a new book,
“Weapons of Math Destruction.” She is concerned about the proliferation
of certain kinds of algorithms – that help make important decisions, but
that could be based on unfair statistics with hidden biases. She
explains how to look out for them, and what we can do to protect
ourselves.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<hr />
<b>Cathy O'Neil's website</b><br />
<b> </b><a href="https://mathbabe.org/">https://mathbabe.org/</a><br />
<br />
<b>Executive Edge Video</b><br />
<b> </b><a href="http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000549011">http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000549011</a><br />
<br />
<b>YouTube Video</b><br />
<b> </b><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdCJYsKlX_Y">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gdCJYsKlX_Y</a><br />
<br />
<b>More or Less Podcast </b>(2 September 2016)<a href="http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000549011"><br /></a><br />
<a class="stream_comment_link" href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p046x243" target="_blank">http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p046x243</a><br />
<a class="stream_comment_link" href="http://open.live.bbc.co.uk/mediaselector/5/redir/version/2.0/mediaset/audio-nondrm-download/proto/http/vpid/p046n56s.mp3" target="_blank">http://open.live.bbc.co.uk/mediaselector/5/redir/version/2.0/mediaset/audio-nondrm-download/proto/http/vpid/p046n56s.mp3</a><br />
<a href="http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000549011"><br /></a>
<b>Extract</b><br />
<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/sep/01/how-algorithms-rule-our-working-lives">https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/sep/01/how-algorithms-rule-our-working-lives</a><br />
<br />
<b>Interviews with the Author</b><br />
<a href="http://www.salon.com/2016/09/08/the-case-against-big-data-it-is-like-youre-being-put-into-a-cult-but-you-dont-actually-believe-in-it/">http://www.salon.com/2016/09/08/the-case-against-big-data-it-is-like-youre-being-put-into-a-cult-but-you-dont-actually-believe-in-it/</a><br />
<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/oct/27/cathy-oneil-weapons-of-math-destruction-algorithms-big-data">https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/oct/27/cathy-oneil-weapons-of-math-destruction-algorithms-big-data</a> <br />
<br />
<b>Reviews</b><br />
<a href="https://www.math.columbia.edu/%7Ewoit/wordpress/?p=8732">https://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=8732</a><br />
<a href="http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/roots-of-unity/review-weapons-of-math-destruction/">http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/roots-of-unity/review-weapons-of-math-destruction/</a><br />
<a class="stream_comment_link" href="https://www.infoq.com/articles/weapons-of-math-destruction-review" target="_blank">https://www.infoq.com/articles/weapons-of-math-destruction-review</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/12/22/they-have-right-now-another-you/">http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/12/22/they-have-right-now-another-you/</a><br />
<br />
<b>Related Posts</b><br />
<a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2016/10/the-shelf-life-of-algorithms.html">The Shelf-Life of Algorithms</a> (October 2016)<br />
<a href="http://demandingchange.blogspot.com/2016/10/the-transparency-of-algorithms.html">The Transparency of Algorithms</a> (October 2016)<br />
<a href="https://demandingchange.blogspot.co.uk/2016/11/pay-as-you-share.html">Pay as you Share</a> (November 2016) Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-8319764473842734612016-02-07T23:42:00.001+00:002017-02-05T12:43:08.310+00:00The Leadership Secrets of Hewlett Packard@<a href="https://twitter.com/lucykellaway/status/694062374492463104">lucykellaway</a> complains about the boneheaded aphorisms from Davos’s windy summit. Among other things, she critiques the advice given by Meg Whitman of HP — “You can always go faster than you think you can” — and
points out that no, you can’t. Sometimes, when you go faster you fall
flat on your face.<br />
<br />
I hate to say this, but Lucy Kellaway is not entirely correct here. Or at least her counter-example doesn't prove her point. When you fall flat on your face, you ARE going faster than you thought you could. Just not quite in the direction you wanted.<br />
<br />
But that's not to let Meg Whitman off the hook. Her quote has been widely disseminated as a leadership lesson. Framed thus, it appears to encourage people to ALWAYS go faster than they thought they could, and to imply that going faster than you thought you could is ALWAYS a good thing.<br />
<br />
But what if it's not quite in the direction you wanted?<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
<div dir="ltr" lang="en">
World Economic Forum underway. Meg about to participate in digital transformation panel. <a href="https://twitter.com/HPE">@HPE</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/wef">@wef</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/Davos">@Davos</a> <a href="https://t.co/OeGK1sarhy">pic.twitter.com/OeGK1sarhy</a></div>
— Henry Gomez (@magicgus) <a href="https://twitter.com/magicgus/status/689743467216519168">January 20, 2016</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<br />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
<div dir="ltr" lang="en">
“The future belongs to the fast” - Meg Whitman <a href="https://twitter.com/Davos">@Davos</a> <a href="https://t.co/uYR2Kb3oeA">https://t.co/uYR2Kb3oeA</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/wef?src=hash">#wef</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/digitaleconomy?src=hash">#digitaleconomy</a> <a href="https://t.co/S04angFGzD">pic.twitter.com/S04angFGzD</a></div>
— HPE (@HPE) <a href="https://twitter.com/HPE/status/689998357364871169">January 21, 2016</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<br />
The plot thickens. The Financial Times receives an email from Henry "MagicGus" Gomez, head of marketing and communications at Hewlett Packard Enterprise, alleging biased reporting on Ms Kellaway's part, and warning FT management to consider the impact of unacceptable biases on its relationships with advertisers.<br />
<br />
Fortunately, FT management is made of sterner stuff. <br />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
<div dir="ltr" lang="en">
My reply to HP, which threatened to cut ads in FT after reading my col. I love the FT for letting me write this. <a href="https://t.co/m4oBFxzHFn">https://t.co/m4oBFxzHFn</a></div>
— Lucy Kellaway (@lucykellaway) <a href="https://twitter.com/lucykellaway/status/696392193884475392">February 7, 2016</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<br />
<hr />
HT @<a href="https://twitter.com/stoiczak/status/694181765930426370">stoiczak</a><br />
<a href="http://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2016/sessions/the-digital-transformation-of-industries"><br /></a>
<a href="http://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2016/sessions/the-digital-transformation-of-industries">Digital Transformation of Industries</a> (World Economic Forum, 20-23 January 2016)<br />
<br />
Stéphanie Thomson, <a href="http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/leadership-lessons-from-davos-2016">Leadership lessons from Davos 2016</a> (World Economic Forum, 23 January 2016)<br />
<br />
Lucy Kellaway, <a href="https://t.co/bUCHoeiF9F">Boneheaded aphorisms from Davos’s windy summit</a> (FT 1 February 2016)<br />
<br />
Lucy Kellaway, <a href="https://t.co/m4oBFxzHFn">An old-school reply to an advertiser’s retro threat</a> (FT 7 February 2016)<br />
<br />
<i>Paywall note: I believe the FT allows one link per day for non-subscribers.</i>Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-21333301785821579242016-02-04T13:10:00.000+00:002016-02-04T13:10:28.864+00:00System Thinking Presentations@<a href="https://twitter.com/DubberlyDesign/status/523169829675474944">DubberlyDesign</a> Hugh Dubberly's talk on Systems Literacy at the RSD3 (Relating Systems Thinking and Design 3) 2014<br />
<br />
<br />
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="290" marginheight="0" marginwidth="0" scrolling="no" src="//www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/key/wlCX0SHVCef6Ck" style="border-width: 1px; border: 1px solid #ccc; margin-bottom: 5px; max-width: 100%;" width="340"> </iframe> <br />
<div style="margin-bottom: 5px;">
<b> <a href="https://www.slideshare.net/robinbahr/h-dubberly-systemliteracy10172014" target="_blank" title="A Systems Literacy Manifesto / Hugh Dubberly ">A Systems Literacy Manifesto / Hugh Dubberly </a> </b> from <b><a href="https://www.slideshare.net/robinbahr" target="_blank">Robin Bahr</a></b> </div>
Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-79925517058082755872015-10-13T21:57:00.001+01:002020-07-09T14:18:53.161+01:00Into The MatrixThe 2x2 matrix is one of the most popular tools in the consultant's toolkit, as well as a regular staple in university textbooks. Consultants like them, because they make simple PowerPoint slides. Instructors like them because they are easy to present, and easy to set exam questions against.<br />
<br />
Like any tool, the 2x2 matrix has some valid uses for some situations, as well as some gross abuses. In this post, I want to discuss some of the ways in which the 2x2 matrix can be used.<br />
<br />
Matrixes may be used for decision-making (choice). For example, when picking a technology product, many people may start from the Gartner “Magic Quadrant” and only look at the vendors that Gartner has placed in the “leader” quadrant.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://storagemojo.com/wp-content/uploads//2009/11/mq_graphic.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="278" src="http://storagemojo.com/wp-content/uploads//2009/11/mq_graphic.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
Of course this means that they are reliant on Gartner’s criteria, which may not perfectly match their own requirements and company policies. For example, Open Source products tend not to score well on Gartner’s criteria. And the “leader” products may not be the most competitively priced. But sometimes a quick shortcut may be good enough.<br />
<br />
Another use of 2x2 matrixes is to show a good balance between different quadrants. For example, the Boston Grid (also known as the Growth-Share Matrix) is used to achieve a balanced product portfolio – you need to invest in question marks and rising stars, because some of them will become your future cash cows.<br />
<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.quickmba.com/strategy/matrix/bcg/"><img border="0" src="http://www.quickmba.com/images/strategy/matrix/bcg/growthshare.gif" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
Portfolio matrixes such as the Boston Grid can be used to direct different actions for each quadrant - most companies will have different management policies for cash cows and rising stars.<br />
<br />
This highlights a third use of 2x2 matrixes, which is to guide policy and action for specific cases, according to which quadrant they belong to. Another matrix that can be used in this way is the <a href="http://www.ies.aust.com/ten/ten38.htm">Enterprise-Architecture-As-Strategy</a> framework, which is used to encourage a situation-dependent (or “contingent”) approach, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.<br />
<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<img border="0" height="193" src="http://www.ies.aust.com/ten/ten38_files/image002.jpg" width="320" /><span id="goog_193977614"></span><span id="goog_193977615"></span><a href="https://www.blogger.com/"></a></div>
<br />
Sometimes there is an implication that the top-right quadrant is the “Good” quadrant. So for example, some people wrongly interpret the Enterprise-Architecture-As-Strategy matrix as setting “Unification” to be the ultimate goal for enterprise architecture in every organization. (That’s what happens when people look at the matrix and imagine they don’t need to bother reading the rest of the book.) See my post on <a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2010/05/differentiation-and-integration.html">Differentiation and Integration</a> (May 2010).<br />
<br />
<br />
All the matrixes we have looked at so far have scale – typically a scale from Low to High. This means that it's not just about which quadrant, but we can compare the relative positions of two items within the same quadrant. For example, within the “leader” quadrant, some may be higher and further to the right. When there is a meaningful scale in both dimensions, the 2x2 matrix can sometimes turn into a 3x3 matrix (Low-Medium-High).<br />
<br />
However, not all 2x2 matrixes have scale. An example of a 2x2 matrix without a clear scale is the Cynefin framework. Like the Enterprise-Architecture-as-Strategy matrix, this is also used to support a contingency approach to consulting - directing the consultant to adopt a completely different approach for each quadrant, without implying that any quadrant is "better" than any other quadrant.<br />
<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/15/Cynefin_as_of_1st_June_2014.png/280px-Cynefin_as_of_1st_June_2014.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/15/Cynefin_as_of_1st_June_2014.png/280px-Cynefin_as_of_1st_June_2014.png" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<br />
Most people use these matrixes for classification and segmentation, like the Hogwarts sorting hat. However, matrixes can also be used dynamically – to understand the possibility of movement between quadrants. For example, how to turn rising stars into cash cows, how to stop cash cows turning into dogs.
<br />
<br />
Some materials on Cynefin (such as the paper by Kurtz and Snowden) also consider transitions between the domains. <i>Situations change over time. As our knowledge increases, there's a natural progression clockwise from Chaos to the Known, while forces of unorder tend to push systems the opposite way. Transitions can be gradual or sudden, and can be decisively one-way, or an oscillation between two domains.</i> The following picture identifies the typical transitions with some explanatory labels.<br />
<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.agilearchitect.org/agile/articles/Cynefin%20Dynamics.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="299" src="http://www.agilearchitect.org/agile/articles/Cynefin%20Dynamics.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
For further examples of migration around a 2x2 matrix, see my post <a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2009/03/tesco-outsources-core-ecommerce.html">Tesco outsources core eCommerce</a> (March 2009).<br />
<br />
<br />
<hr />
<b>Sources</b><br />
<br />
Wikipedia: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boston_Consulting_Group%27s_Advantage_Matrix">Advantage Matrix</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cynefin">Cynefin</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Growth%E2%80%93share_matrix">Growth-Share Matrix</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_Quadrant">Magic Quadrant</a><br />
<br />
Andrew Johnston, <a href="http://www.agilearchitect.org/agile/articles/order%20and%20unorder.asp">Architects - Masters of Order and Unorder</a> (Agile Architect Blog, undated)<br />
Nate Orenstam, <a href="http://www.valleyofthegeeks.com/News/GartnerQuadrant.html">Gartner Magick Quadrante</a> (Valley of the Geeks, February 2008)
<br />
Jonathan Sharp, <a href="http://www.latisys.com/blog-post/what-is-the-gartner-magic-quadrant">What is the Gartner Magic Quadrant?</a> (Latisys Blog, Sept 2014)<br />
<a href="http://www.quickmba.com/strategy/matrix/bcg/">BCG Growth-Share Matrix</a> (Quick MBA)<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.ies.aust.com/ten/ten38.htm">Enterprise Architecture as Strategy</a> (The Enterprise Newsletter 38, Sept 2007)<br />
<br />
<hr />
<b>Related Posts</b><br />
<br />
<a href="http://rvsoftware.blogspot.co.uk/2009/08/magic-quadrant-or-sorting-hat.html">Magic Quadrant or Sorting Hat</a> (August 2009)<br />
<a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2010/05/differentiation-and-integration.html">Differentiation and Integration</a> (May 2010)<br />
<a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2009/03/tesco-outsources-core-ecommerce.html">Tesco outsources core eCommerce</a> (March 2009)Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-6447266992160078532014-10-26T22:15:00.005+00:002014-10-26T22:15:50.008+00:00Apprenticeship 3#TheApprentice is a TV reality show, pretending to be about management. See my earlier posts <a href="http://businessorganizationmanagement.blogspot.co.uk/2011/02/apprenticeship.html">Apprenticeship</a> (Feb 2011), <a href="http://businessorganizationmanagement.blogspot.co.uk/2013/06/apprenticeship-2.html">Apprenticeship 2</a> (June 2013).<br />
<br />
Opinion polls suggest that programmes like The Apprentice
may be putting young people off careers in business. Frances
Dickens of @<a href="https://twitter.com/AstusUK/">AstusUK</a> says we have a problem if young people can’t realise they are
watching a televised caricature of entrepreneurship.<br />
<br />
If the real purpose of the show is to entertain, a degree of repetition and predictability would be a problem. As @<a href="https://twitter.com/stuheritage/status/525237266793627648">StuHeritage</a> complains<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"The tasks this year – sell some stuff you’ve only just seen, invent
something that you have no real expertise in, spend two hours
manufacturing a product that you clearly know nothing about – are merely
tired rehashes of things we’ve seen before."</blockquote>
<br />
Yes, these tasks are silly, because they trivialize the challenges of business, they underrate the importance of knowledge and experience, and rate short-term effort (and luck) above persistence and resilience.<br />
<br />
But repetition and predictability are central to the concept of apprenticeship. You can't do something perfectly first time, you have to have many attempts, over an extended period, under the guidance of a Master, before you can achieve mastery yourself. The figure of 10,000 hours is often cited. <br />
<br />
Above all, the concept of apprenticeship depends on stationarity - roughly, the idea that the future will resemble the past, which implies that the young can profit from the experience of the old. Talent shows such as X Factor often follow this idea strongly, as young aspiring musicians are required to copy the great masters of past decades, as well as obediently following the direction of their celebrated "mentors": originality is politely discouraged. Whereas the media view of business is largely based on the fantasy that a brilliant entrepreneurial idea will allow the aspiring entrepreneur to bypass much of the hard work and repeated disappointment that previous entrepreneurs have suffered. The candidates in The Apprentice often seem to treat the show not as a learning opportunity but as an extended opportunity to show off what they already know. Or rather what they think they already know. Of course, the audience knows better, thanks to the knowing winks of the grown-ups, allowing an ironic appreciation of the idiocy and vanity of the candidates, and an associated lack of appreciation of the talents that might actually lead to success in business.<br />
<br />
<hr />
<br />
Ben Carter, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-26384712">Can 10,000 hours of practice make you an expert?</a> (BBC Magazine, 1 March 2014)
<br />
<br />
Frances Dickens, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-network-blog/2014/oct/22/apprentice-dragons-den-business-entrepreneur">Has The Apprentice ruined what it means to be an entrepreneur?</a> (Guardian 22 October 2014)<br />
<br />
Martin Geddes, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/article/20141024063134-169817-what-is-stationarity-and-why-does-it-matter">What is stationarity and why does it matter?</a> (Linked-In Pulse, 24 October 2014)<br />
<br />
Stuart Heritage, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/tvandradioblog/2014/oct/23/apprentice-clear-desk-go-alan-sugar">It's time for The Apprentice to clear its desk and go</a> (Guardian, 23 October 2014)
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-70467402673961432212014-09-08T23:17:00.000+01:002014-09-09T16:46:57.950+01:00Are managers worrying enough?@flowchainsensei (Bob Marshall) thinks "<a href="https://twitter.com/flowchainsensei/status/504140441370263552">it’s pretty obvious that managers don’t lie awake nights worrying about the effectiveness of their wider organisations</a>" and "<a href="https://twitter.com/flowchainsensei/status/504225146685906944">it’s pretty obvious that managers don’t lie awake nights worrying about how to motivate, engage their staff</a>".
<br />
<br />
For both tweets he invokes the #<a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/POSIWID?src=hash">POSIWID</a> hashtag.<br />
<br />
I don't think it's obvious that managers are not worried . Even if most managers achieve little or nothing to improve the effectiveness of their organizations, or the motivation of their staff, that doesn't mean they aren't worried about these things. Stafford Beer's POSIWID principle tells us that the effectiveness of an organization is not always a straightforward consequence of the intentions or anxieties of its managers.<br />
<br />
On his blog, Bob himself explains <a href="http://flowchainsensei.wordpress.com/2014/09/03/why-corporates-cant-change/">Why Corporates Can't Change</a>. He also argues that "<a href="https://twitter.com/flowchainsensei/status/507776017000587264">in most organisations, pretending about doing things meets more needs than actually doing those things</a>". In other words, <a href="http://flowchainsensei.wordpress.com/2014/09/05/its-all-an-act/">It's All An Act</a>.<br />
<br />
But this is surely one of the primary sources of organizational anxiety - the contradiction between pretence and reality. Is Bob really complaining that managers aren't worrying enough? Surely worry (or lack of worry) is a symptom rather than a cause?Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-32005137424802927622014-04-22T09:39:00.002+01:002014-04-22T09:39:23.088+01:00Search versus discoveryThey're not the same, writes Seth Godin, in fact, they couldn't be much more different.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2014/04/search-vs-discovery.html">http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2014/04/search-vs-discovery.html</a><br />
<br />
Retailers
need to help customers to DISCOVER things they didn't know they wanted,
not just SEARCH for things they already knew they wanted.<br />
<br />
Just
as librarians (and knowledge management websites) need to help readers
to discover books and other reading material they didn't know they
wanted. And not just tell them (as Google and Amazon do) the books that everyone else has already read.Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-79950204856304859652014-03-14T07:58:00.000+00:002014-04-04T23:08:16.987+01:00On Working At Home<a href="http://www.linkedin.com/nhome/updates?topic=5849478372459048960#">James McGovern</a> started an interesting discussion on Linked-In and Twitter.<br />
<br />
@<a href="https://twitter.com/mcgoverntheory/status/443712828508090368">mcgoverntheory</a> If my employees were 2x as productive at home, I wouldn’t care if they worked 1/2 the time. I wonder how many managers agree?<br />
<br />
@<a href="http://twitter.com/richardveryard">richardveryard</a> Do you apply the same logic in the office? If an employee does a day's work before lunch, are you happy for her to go to the beach in the afternoon?<br />
<br />
<a href="http://uk.linkedin.com/pub/nik-webster/7/8b9/312">Nik Webster</a> I subscribe exactly to this approach where fixed price contract is concerned. If a customer is contracting you for the output if your deliverables why should the staff be any different. Without at least a flexible approach to this idiom, good performers are essentially penalised.<br />
<br />
@<a href="http://twitter.com/chuckcatania">chuckcatania</a>
Richard, I do. And there are some companies starting to look at it the same way, particularly in Silicon Valley. But, not quite in that way. I'd look at it as... if you finished a full day's work before lunch, take the rest of the day for business-related activities... go networking. Take the afternoon and hit a bucket of balls, or go to the spa, or go to the firing range with prospective clients or co-workers or current clients. And we're starting to see this mindset a little bit more... thought provoking post, James.<br />
<br />
<hr />
<br />
Chuck clearly wants to have it both ways. If you have a really productive morning, you can be rewarded by having the afternoon off. But you are expected to use the time in a way that benefits the company, In other words, the hours still belong to the company, not to the employee.<br />
<br />
I prefer Nik's position. (As it happens, Nik is a colleague of mine at Glue Reply.) High performers should be rewarded for productivity. Wherever possible, workers should be managed and rewarded according to the outputs or outcomes they produce rather than the number of hours they put in. (This is one of the reasons for preferring fixed-price or output-based pricing for consultancy and contracting work whenever possible, rather than the dreaded "time-and-materials" contract. However, there are reasons why this isn't always commercially viable, which I don't want to go into here.)<br />
<br />
This raises the question of consistency and consequence. If an employee is managed on one basis when in the office and on a different basis when working at home, then this creates an imbalance. The high performers may prefer to work at home, and the low performers may prefer coming to the office and counting the hours. Managers may say this is okay, because they trust the high performers more than the low performers, but that's not the point. In any case, when individuals are having an unproductive day, they can waste just as much time in the office as they can at home, and waste other people's time as well.<br />
<br />
@<a href="http://twitter.com/Mrguybrowning">Mrguybrowning</a> writes, "Most people are now self-managing.
When you work from home do you have your boss in the spare room to make
sure you're OK? No, you don't. Technology and empowerment have
liberated us from the traditional hierarchy." (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/17/managers-make-difference-company">Managers must make a difference – otherwise why keep them?</a> Guardian 17 March 2014)<br />
<hr />
<br />
Some employers want to encourage people to spend more time in the office - not for the sake of closer monitoring and control, but for the sake of improved collaboration. @<a href="http://twitter.com/DavidAmerland" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">DavidAmerland</a> writes, "The very technology that enables telecommuting and working from home could be destroying its value. Although productivity may increase in the short term, working from home may prevent your teams from working effectively." (<a href="http://www.forbes.com/sites/netapp/2013/06/24/working-from-home/">The Real Problem In Working From Home - It's Not What You Think</a>, Forbes June 2013)<br />
<br />
Unfortunately, offices don't always foster productivity and collaboration. See my post <a href="http://demandingchange.blogspot.com/2013/02/how-offices-make-people-stupid.html">How Offices Make People Stupid</a> (Feb 2013).<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, those who are obliged to work at home need to find ways to maintain productivity and focus, as well as appropriate levels of interaction. See Rodrigo Franco, <a href="https://techblog.livingsocial.com/blog/2014/04/02/working-from-home-heres-an-extra-shot-of-focus/">Working From Home? Here's an Extra Shot of Focus</a> (LivingSocial Technology Blog April 2014)<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">Updated 4 April 2014</span><br />
<br />
<br />Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-50128956240729681032013-06-06T10:51:00.000+01:002013-06-06T10:51:14.555+01:00Apprenticeship 2The Apprentice is a TV reality show, pretending to be about management. See my earlier post on <a href="http://businessorganizationmanagement.blogspot.co.uk/2011/02/apprenticeship.html">Apprenticeship</a> (Feb 2011).<br />
<br />
Following the latest programme, Derek Miers (@<a href="http://twitter.com/bpmfocus/status/342559326327685120">bpmfocus</a>) argued that <a href="http://blogs.forrester.com/derek_miers/13-06-04-why_all_the_apprentices_should_be_fired">All the apprentices should be fired</a> (June 2013). Derek was struck by how completely disorganized the candidates all appeared to be. I suggested that this appearance might be distorted by the TV edit, which would obviously leave out all the boring bits where people are doing things properly. "<a href="http://twitter.com/bpmfocus/status/342560585562587136">Yeah right</a>", he replied.<br />
<br />
@<a href="http://twitter.com/DavidFCox/status/342556346937376768">DavidFCox</a> writes "Who is responsible for #theapprentice failures here? @Lord_Sugar for the ridiculous time scale. A sensible one cd have found gr8 product." @<a href="http://twitter.com/1xChrisHarvey/status/342570896126525442">1xChrisHarvey</a> agrees "Lord Sugar, you're fired." <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/tvandradio/the-apprentice/10101746/The-Apprentice-2013-episode-6-BBC-One-review.html">The Apprentice 2013, episode 6, BBC One, review</a> (Telegraph 5 June 2013)<br />
<br />
Failure? In entertainment terms, the only failure is bad ratings. The Purpose of the System is What it Does. Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-36913851953820632152013-02-19T14:46:00.003+00:002013-02-19T14:46:59.192+00:00A Cost-Saving Case Study<h4 style="text-align: center;">
Scenario</h4>
<br />
In previous years, Smartchester City College has received income from
the Mordenvia Bank, which has its head office in Smartchester and sends
many of its employees to the college for management training.<br />
<br />
Three
years ago, the college opened a new training facility (known as the
Mordenvia Building) with a generous grant from the bank. <br />
<br />
The
Mordenvia Bank has now informed the college that it is moving its head
office to the Bahamas, and that employees will in future receive all
their management training online. The college is invited to submit a
proposal for the provision of this training, but it is clear that the
bank expects this to be significantly cheaper than traditional training.<br />
<br />
Taking
into account other projects and grants from the bank, the college
expects to lose around 5% of its annual income, and must reduce its
costs by an equivalent amount.<br />
<br />
However, there were some special
costs associated with satisfying the bank's training requirements. The
bank trainees followed a customized training programme, and did not
share lectures with other students. <br />
<br />
The loss of training
business from the bank may therefore create an opportunity to
rationalize training provision and remove inefficiencies.<br />
<br />
The college must therefore consider the following cost-saving measures.<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>Reducing the number of lectures, or reducing the number of hours. </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Reducing the amount of time lecturers are allocated for non-teaching work (including developing new courses). </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Closing the Mordenvia Building, or converting it to other uses </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Reducing or eliminating the financial support given to impoverished students.</li>
</ul>
<br />
Some of these measures may involve short-term costs (such as redundancy
payments) or may negatively impact future income. Some of these measures
may be reversible, others irreversible.<br />
<br />
<br />
<hr />
<h4 style="text-align: center;">
Questions</h4>
<br />
<ul>
<li>How would you evaluate the different options? </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>What extra information would you need?</li>
</ul>
<br />
<br />
<hr />
<h4 style="text-align: center;">
Further Analysis</h4>
<h4>
</h4>
<br />
Cost Identification/Classification <br />
<ul>
<li>Where are the costs?</li>
<li>What things (and what kinds of things) are the costs associated with? </li>
<li>How do costs vary? </li>
</ul>
<br />
Cost Algebra <br />
<ul>
<li>How do we add, subtract, multiply and divide costs? </li>
<li>Understanding interactions and indirect costs </li>
</ul>
<br />
Cost Optics <br />
<ul>
<li>Which lens do we use to view costs? E.g. accounting versus architecture.</li>
</ul>
<br />
Cost Control <br />
<ul>
<li>Where does the responsibility for costs lie? </li>
<li>What are the control loops? What dynamic system behaviour do they produce – e.g. damping, oscillation, hunting? </li>
</ul>
<br />
Cost Motivation <br />
<ul>
<li>Where is the motivation for cost control? Where will any cost savings be distributed? </li>
<li>What theory of incentives is espoused / in use? How does this affect cost outcomes? </li>
</ul>
<br />
Cost Outcomes<br />
<ul>
<li>Are cost savings reversible?</li>
<li>Do we expect cost savings to be permanent or temporary? (In other words, will the costs revert to previous levels?)</li>
<li>What other consequences?</li>
</ul>
Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-62594684282980977922013-02-16T09:19:00.001+00:002013-02-16T09:19:48.338+00:00What is Synergy?Mergers and acquisitions are often justified by appeal to something called synergy - the whole being worth more than the sum of the parts. For example, I found one source that divided synergies into operational synergies and financial synergies.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"Operating synergies affect the operations of the combined firm and include economies of scale, increasing pricing power and higher growth potential. They generally show up as higher expected cash flows. Financial synergies, on the other hand, are more focused and include tax benefits, diversification, a higher debt capacity and uses for excess cash. They sometimes show up as higher cash flows and sometimes take the form of lower discount rates."</blockquote>
<div style="text-align: right;">
Aswath Damodaran, <a href="http://www.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/pdfiles/papers/synergy.pdf">The Value of Synergy</a> (pdf)<br />
Stern School of Business October 2005</div>
<br />
<br />
<br />
Some systems thinkers would not regard economies of scale and other cost savings as genuine synergies. They prefer to concentrate on the positive improvements to income and growth, as well as the indirect social benefits. From an accounting perspective, there is no essential difference between higher revenue and lower cost - if the whole costs less than the sum of its parts, for a given quantity of output, then it must be worth more. But a systems perspective may reject this kind of accounting perspective. <br />
<br />
From a systems perspective, we are probably also interested in network effects and indirect value. Consider the "benefits" to users if Linked-In merged with Facebook, thus increasing the size of everyone's network. (There are probably better examples than this one.) <br />
<br />
What I think is useful is to unpack the basic definition of synergy. Synergy means the whole is worth more than the sum of its parts. <br />
<br />
WORTH<br />
<ul>
<li>To whom? Shareholders, customers? </li>
<li>From what perspective? Stock market, competition?</li>
<li>How measured? Financial value, indirect value?</li>
</ul>
<br />
MORE THAN<br />
<ul>
<li>What timescale? Some kinds of synergy may be almost immediate, such as increased bargaining power.</li>
</ul>
<br />
SUM OF PARTS<br />
<ul>
<li>How composed, what is the nature of the composition. Among other things, we might consider how composition by merger produces any different kind of synergy than composition by partnership or any other arrangement. </li>
<li>Clearly merger is not the only way to achieve operational synergies. One of the challenges for post-merger integration is to make structural and behavioural changes to systems that will release the promised synergies. Some disciplines, such as enterprise architecture (EA), concentrate on the formal structural and behavioural aspects of merging systems, but there are many other issues, including culture, that are not in the standard EA toolbox.</li>
</ul>
<br />
Overall, I think we must recognize that synergy is in the eye of the beholder. Often companies play a game of making the synergies look very high when talking to the stock market, while downplaying the synergies when talking to regulators. They try to persuade the regulators that the merger will create jobs and allow them to offer a better deal to customers, but this is of course totally incompatible with what they've told the City. <br />
<br />
<br />Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-25524361636728565532013-01-28T13:09:00.000+00:002017-04-15T10:18:55.197+01:00For Whose Benefit Are Airports Designed?In <a href="http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2013/01/ten-things-organizations-can-learn-from-airports-.html">Eleven Things Organizations Can Learn From Airports</a> (January 2013), Seth Godin tells us why he dislikes airports.<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>Passengers are powerless transients. Frequent flyers may get a slightly better service than infrequent flyers, but the overall experience is still poor. When someone asks if you had a good flight, the best answer you can give is that nothing happened - in other words, it wasn't any worse than usual. </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>The food - and everything else for that matter - is bland, middle-of-the-road pap. Aimed at someone's idea of majority taste. </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Noone has any interest in making the airport experience less awful. There doesn't seem to be any way of providing an extension cord and a power strip to allow more passengers to recharge their laptops and phones. (Maybe there will be more power outlets next time the airport is refitted, but in the meantime there is no mechanism for adhoc improvement.)</li>
</ul>
<br />
But Seth Godin makes a fundamental error when he describes the passengers as customers. It is as plain as the long queue for the X-ray machine that the airport is not designed for the benefit of the customers. In descending order of importance, the airport's customers are as follows.<br />
<br />
1. Airlines<br />
2. Retail franchises<br />
3. Security, immigration and customs.<br />
4. Local services, such as cab drivers<br />
5. Baggage-handling, etc.<br />
<br />
...<br />
<br />
99. Passengers<br />
<br />
<br />
In case you need convincing that the cab drivers are more important than the passengers, just go to any airport and compare the land-side coffee (for cab drivers) with the air-side coffee (for captive passengers only).<br />
<br />
Of course, the airlines and retailers and cab drivers all need a large quantity of passengers: they are the customers of the customers of the airport. The airport is a multi-sided platform, trying to balance the interests of the airlines (who want to shepherd their passengers through quickly) against the interests of the retailers (who want passengers to spend time shopping while waiting for their flights).<br />
<br />
So for whose benefit are airports designed? Not passengers, obviously.<br />
<br />
<hr />
<h4>
Quotes</h4>
"Britain used to have airports with some shops. Now we have shopping malls with some flights." (<a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/12/the-guardian-view-on-the-airport-vat-rip-off-theyve-got-it-tail-about-nose">Guardian Editorial</a>, 12 August 2015)<br />
<br />
"As awful as the airlines can be—they routinely mistreat customers,
misplace baggage, cancel flights—the actual on-board experience that the
carriers control is only part of what makes flying so miserable today" (<a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2017/04/united_isn_t_the_reason_air_travel_is_so_miserable.html">Daniel Gross, Slate, 14 April 2017</a>) <br />
<br />
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-lang="en">
<div dir="ltr" lang="en">
For whoever redesigned Stansted, the path to Hades will be paved with an eternal march through winding, narrow, overcrowded retail outlets.</div>
— Martin Geddes (@martingeddes) <a href="https://twitter.com/martingeddes/status/725639852247670784">April 28, 2016</a></blockquote>
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<br />
<hr />
<h4>
Related Posts </h4>
<a href="https://posiwid.blogspot.co.uk/2005/05/dangerous-coffee.html">Dangerous Coffee</a> (May 2005)<br />
<a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2006/08/service-oriented-security.htm">Service-Oriented Security</a> (August 2006) <br />
<a href="http://posiwid.blogspot.com/2008/03/travel-hopefully.html" title="POSIWID">Travel Hopefully</a> (March 2008)<br />
<a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.com/2008/03/heathrow-terminal-5.html">Heathrow Terminal 5</a> (March 2008)<br />
<a href="http://businessorganizationmanagement.blogspot.com/2013/01/anxiety-as-cost.html">Anxiety as a Cost</a> (January 2013) <br />
<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">Quotes added 13 August 2015, 15 April 2017 </span><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">Tweet added 29 April 2016 </span>Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-9504990371407569852013-01-28T08:59:00.000+00:002017-04-15T10:18:55.204+01:00Anxiety as a CostThe airline industry operates according to a simplistic theory of customer value. In <a href="http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2013/01/ten-things-organizations-can-learn-from-airports-.html">Eleven Things Organizations Can Learn From Airports</a> (January 2013), Seth Godin criticizes this theory.<br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"By removing slack, airlines create failure. In order to increase profit,
airlines work hard to get the maximum number of flights out of each
plane, each day. As a result, there are no spares, no downtime and no
resilience. By assuming that their customer base prefers to save money,
not anxiety, they create an anxiety-filled system."</blockquote>
<br />
Alan Patrick (@<a href="http://twitter.com/freecloud/status/295597319766831104">freecloud</a>) believes that the airline theory is correct: "fwiw the work we did show that many customers value price, fewer value low anxiety".<br />
<br />
Sometimes it is not hard for companies to collect evidence to reinforce their assumptions, but we need to examine and interpret such evidence carefully. Here are some things to consider.<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>Statements about customer preference may be based on survey (asking them about their preferences) or behaviour (inferring preferences from their choices). Behaviour might seem to be a more reliable indicator than survey. </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>However, people make choices based on the information they have. If they appear to choose between airlines based solely on price, that might mean they think other factors don't matter, but it might also mean they don't expect any airline to be better than any of the others. Furthermore, obsessive attention to price may represent a suppression of more difficult issues. </li>
</ul>
<ul>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Many people simply don't fly at all, or choose alternative forms of transport wherever possible, because they find flying such an unpleasant or frightening experience. If you only look at the people who do fly, this is a biased sample. See for example Liesl Schillinger, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/weekinreview/03schillinger.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&">The Cost of High Anxiety About Flying</a> (New York Times Jan 2010). </li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>People often don't acknowledge anxiety, they just find other reasons not to be your customer.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
</ul>
<br />
In economic terms, we can regard anxiety as a cost. This cost doesn't
appear on the airlines' financial accounts, for two reasons. Firstly,
because it is not easily represented in monetary terms, and secondly
because it is not directly incurred by the airlines but by their
customers. See my post on the <a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/the-calculus-of-cost-2.html">Calculus of Cost</a> (January 2013). <br />
<br />
For that matter, companies don't always recognize the anxieties experienced by their own employees, although there is some awareness of this question in some sectors (such as military and healthcare) where anxiety can have life-and-death consequences. Robert Johnson explores this factor in the US Army. <br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<br />
"People take shelter, as it were, behind their official roles. One becomes, in essence, an anonymous member of the institution's "collective instrumentality". Under these conditions, one may feel little or no personal responsibility for one's actions. Alternatively, one may feel personally responsible for one's conduct but view any guilt or anxiety as a cost of maintaining one's honorable commitments to the institution."</blockquote>
<br />
More fundamentally, organizations such as military and healthcare derive much of their structure and culture from the psychological pressures faced by people in these organizations. There is a broad literature on this, going back to the work of Menzies Lyth and her colleagues at the Tavistock Institute. So to understand the costs of anxiety, we shouldn't just consider the effects experienced by individuals, but also the organizational costs of protecting people from these effects.<br />
<br />
<br />
<hr />
<br />
Robert Johnson, <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a227060.pdf">Institutional Violence: Organizational and Psychological Issues in the Military Context</a> (ARI Research Note 90-117 Sept 1990)<br />
<br />
Isabel Menzies Lyth, <a href="http://www.moderntimesworkplace.com/archives/ericsess/sessvol1/Lythp439.opd.pdf">Social Systems as a Defense against Anxiety</a> (1959)<br />
<br />
Liesl Schillinger, <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/weekinreview/03schillinger.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&">The Cost of High Anxiety About Flying</a> (New York Times Jan 2010)<br />
<br />
Bruce H. Smith, <a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0094119091900194">Anxiety as a cost of commuting to work</a>
Journal of Urban Economics, 1991, vol. 29, issue 2, pages 260-266 (abstract only)<br />
<br />
<br />Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-72156577031225851862013-01-16T00:05:00.000+00:002013-01-17T13:33:48.934+00:00Intelligent MarketingThe challenge of marketing comes from uncertainty. A businessman (possibly <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Wanamaker" title="Wikipedia - John Wanamaker">John Wanamaker</a>) once said, "Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don't know which half."<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.workinginuncertainty.co.uk/cases_ind_famous_ogilvy.shtml">Matthew Leitch</a> credits David Ogilvy with pioneering an experimental approach to advertising.<br />
<br />
<blockquote>
"Something that distinguished his approach from most other advertising agencies was his focus on using solid research to help make marketing decisions. He loved direct mail (or 'junk' mail as most people call it) because with direct mail it is possible to measure the response to advertising accurately. He could send slightly different advertisements to different groups of people and see what difference it made. He applied the same idea using reply coupons on page advertisements in newspapers and magazines, and used other forms of testing too. ... He also codified his research discoveries into over 100 rules of thumb to be applied to future advertisements. "</blockquote>
Ogilvy's approach has now become a routine element of the marketing process. I found a page on the IBM website documenting a <a href="http://pic.dhe.ibm.com/infocenter/wchelp/v6r0m0/index.jsp?topic=%2Fcom.ibm.commerce.business_process.doc%2Fconcepts%2FprocessMarketing_Experimentation.htm">Marketing Experimentation</a> process to be automated using Websphere Commerce, although maybe it lacks Ogilvy's flair.<br />
<br />
Experimentation allows marketing activity to be differentiated for different categories of customer demand, and refined in order to satisfy marketing goals more cost-effectively. One of the critical success factors here is the speed of the feedback loop - the faster the better.<br />
<br />
There are various opportunities here for software technology to facilitate this feedback, by deploying advanced marketing communication tools that allow near-real-time measurement and analysis of campaigns. For example, a company called <a href="http://www.4dm.co.uk/cross_media.aspx">Intelligent Marketing Solutions</a> claims to give you<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<br />
"the ability to track, trace and manage every click your customer makes be it on a PC, Mobile or Tablet, you will know exactly how a campaign is performing around the clock and have the ability to make changes along the way to react to trends in response."</blockquote>
Other marketing tools can be used to provide independent monitoring of the effects of a marketing campaign, such as Buzz. See my post <a href="http://rvsoftware.blogspot.co.uk/2010/05/from-buzz-to-actionable-intelligence.html">From Buzz to Actionable Intelligence</a> (May 2010). If today's Buzz can give us a reasonable estimate of future revenues, then the marketing team can use Buzz as a predictive surrogate metric for the actual commercial success of a campaign.<br />
<br />
Faster feedback can support single-loop learning - getting better at achieving a given set of marketing goals. Michael Mainelli and Ian Harris use a simplified version of VSM to describe a marketing process with feedforward and double-loop learning. Their system includes monitoring, information sharing, sense-making, planning, and continuous improvement - in other words a form of organizational intelligence.<br />
<br />
<hr />
<br />
Dion Hinchcliffe, <a href="http://www.dachisgroup.com/2013/01/advocacy-the-new-currency-of-marketing-and-why-you-need-more-of-it/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+dachisgroup+%28Collaboratory+-+Dachis+Group%29">Advocacy: The New Currency of Marketing</a> (15 January 2013)<br />
<br />
Ira Horowitz, A Note on Advertising and Uncertainty. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 18, No. 2 (April 1970), pp. 151-160 <a href="http://www.jstor.org/stable/2097504">http://www.jstor.org/stable/2097504</a><br />
<br />
Michael Mainelli and Ian Harris, <a href="http://www.zyen.com/component/content/article/13-systems/173-is-your-organisation-viable-systems-articles-1999.html">Is Your Organisation Viable? – Customer Relationship Management Systems</a>, Conspectus, Prime Marketing Publications Ltd (October 1999) pages 26-27. via <a href="http://www.workinginuncertainty.co.uk/cases_ZYen.shtml">Matthew Leitch</a><br />
<br />
David Ogilvy, Ogilvy on Advertising (Pan Books, 1983)<br />
<br />
<hr />
Places are still available on my forthcoming workshops <a href="http://unicom.co.uk/product_detail.asp?prdid=1942">Business Awareness</a> (Jan 28), <a href="http://unicom.co.uk/businessarchitecture/">Business Architecture</a> (Jan 29-31), <a href="http://unicom.co.uk/orgintelligence/">Organizational Intelligence</a> (Feb 1). Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-44310343990635815822013-01-07T23:54:00.000+00:002013-01-07T23:54:12.723+00:00Business Awareness WorkshopI am pleased to announce a new one-day workshop, providing business awareness for technical specialists such as IT staff. The workshop will be run in Uxbridge, Middlesex on January 28th 2013.<br />
<br />
For further bookings and details, please visit Unicom website: <a href="http://unicom.co.uk/product_detail.asp?prdid=1942">Business Awareness for IT Specialists</a>.<br />
<br />
Generous discounts available for multiple bookings. Please mention this website when you book.<br />
<br />
Workshop materials include a set of case studies and a copy of the <a href="https://leanpub.com/busorgmgt">Foundations of Business</a> eBook.Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-84515828430782300332012-10-24T17:28:00.001+01:002012-10-24T17:28:41.959+01:00Corporate Elephantiasis"The BBC is an archetypal case of corporate elephantiasis, an
organisation too big to take clear and swift decisions. Its senior
managers are lost in a corporate maze of directorates, divisions,
Chinese walls and spectrums of delegation."<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: right;">
<a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/23/jimmy-savile-witch-hunt-paranoia">Simon Jenkins, Guardian 23 October 2012</a> </div>
<br />
<br />
<br />
The popular belief in merger and acquisition to deliver economics of scale overlooks the common reality "that high executives from one of the previously separate corporations would
be at loggerheads with executives from the other, that from top to
bottom the cultures of melded corporations wouldn’t mesh, that cost
savings wouldn’t materialize, that earnings would not be smoothed out,
that purchasing corporations wouldn’t know how to make good use of
acquired corporations, that different industries require very different
mentalities, that size was achieved by destroying highly innovative,
often new companies, that companies make acquisitions not because this
creates better economic entities but because it creates more power, more
prestige and vast compensation for high executives".<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: right;">
Dean Velvel, <a href="http://velvelonnationalaffairs.blogspot.co.uk/2008/09/re-bigger-company-more-disastrous.html">The Bigger The Company, The More Disastrous The Mistake</a> (September 2008) </div>
<br />
<br />
<br />
"Many companies try to grow via big acquisitions. These deals are
seductive, because you get lots of favorable ink and a love buzz from
Wall Street. You also buy time to implement your strategy, if you
actually have one, because year-to-year financials aren't comparable and
outsiders can't analyze your results. WorldCom is a classic case.
Chief executive Bernie Ebbers--make that former chief executive
Ebbers--wanted his grandly named enterprise to be the nation's biggest
telecom firm. He got up to No. 2 by making about five dozen
acquisitions. But when the takeover music stopped two years ago after
regulators nixed his proposed purchase of Sprint, it became clear the
company was a mess. Bye-bye, Bernie. And with WorldCom stock down 95
percent from its high, bye-bye to $100 billion of shareholder wealth."<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: right;">
Allan Sloan, <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2002/05/12/memo-to-ceos-bigger-isn-t-better.html">Memo To Ceos: Bigger Isn't Better</a> (Newsweek via Daily Beast, May 2002)
</div>
Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-69593364775751466682012-05-19T00:00:00.000+01:002013-01-08T00:05:55.197+00:00Requisite Variety and Wall Street RegulationOpinions are divided within JP Morgan Chase about the proposed Volcker Rule for Wall Street Regulation. Its chief executive, Mr Jamie Dimon, has repeatedly mocked the new rule that bans proprietary trading in Wall Street banks, and is on record saying that Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the Federal Reserve and first proponent of banning prop trading, "doesn't understand capital markets".<br />
<br />
Nobody seems to be quite sure whether the Volcker Rule would have prevented JP Morgan's recent loss of $4bn in a series of dodgy trades. Someone called BankerGuy has argued that the Volcker Rule is in fact not complex enough, saying it lacks requisite variety. Stephen Foley comments, "Modern capital markets are complex places, like it or not, and they require complex regulation. If Jamie Dimon believes the Volcker Rule is too complex to implement, it follows that his bank is too complex, too."<br />
<br />
Meanwhile, some other executives at JP Morgan are more positive about the Volcker Rule. Diane Genova, general counsel of JPMorgan Chase's investment bank, speaking at the International Swaps and Derivatives Association conference earlier this month, called the proposed metrics "a really good effort" to define prop trading, and she went on: "We would probably use these anyway as risk management tools. Getting ready to implement these would not be a waste of time."<br />
<br />
<hr />
Stephen Foley, <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/stephen-foley-at-a-stroke-jamie-dimon-has-become-exhibit-a-in-the-case-for-regulation-7767013.html">At a stroke, Jamie Dimon has become Exhibit A in the case for regulation</a> (The Independent, 19 May 2012)<br />
<br />
Hugh Hewitt, <a href="http://www.hughhewitt.com/blog/g/8b1bd9d1-75df-4cdc-bec4-641b977d7f86">The Latest From Banker Guy</a>, 1 February 2010 (via <a href="http://busterfoghorn.blogtownhall.com/2010/02/02/bank_taxes,_too_big_to_fail,_and_the_obama_prescription.thtml">Buster Foghorn</a>)<br />
<br />
See also <a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/regulation-and-complexity.html">Regulation and Complexity</a> (Oct 2012) Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-53921592751567322872012-05-10T00:40:00.000+01:002013-01-08T00:06:21.375+00:00Billing BlundersA quick internet search will find any number of billing blunders. <br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.moneysavingexpert.com/news/phones/2010/08/mass-refunds-for-vodafone-customers-following-billing-blunder">Vodafone to issue mass refunds after billing blunder</a> (Aug 2010)</li>
<li><a href="http://www.moneysavingexpert.com/news/utilities/2010/10/npower-customers-to-get-refunds-for-billing-blunder">Npower to pay £70m in refunds after huge billing blunder</a> (October 2010)</li>
<li><a href="http://www.itpro.co.uk/631441/talktalk-pays-2-5-million-for-billing-blunder">TalkTalk pays £2.5 million for billing blunder</a> (Feb 2011)</li>
<li><a href="http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/1300-customers-hit-by-northern-ireland-water-billing-blunder-16001916.html">1,300 customers hit by Northern Ireland Water billing blunder</a> (May 2011)</li>
<li><a href="http://blog.gadgethelpline.com/tmobile-apologise-billing-blunder-700000-customers-overcharged/">T-Mobile apologise over billing blunder</a> (May 2011) </li>
<li><a href="http://www.nznewsuk.co.uk/business/?ID=19747&StartRow=1&story=Contact-Energy-named-and-shamed-for-billing-blunder">Contact Energy named and shamed for billing blunder</a> (June 2011)
</li>
<li><a href="http://www.billingworld.com/news/2012/03/comcast-blames-wells-fargo-on-billing-blunder.aspx">Comcast blames Wells Fargo for Billing Blunder</a> (March 2012) </li>
</ul>
What are the causes of these blunders? Here are some excuses anyway.<br />
<ul>
<li>Outsourcing - for example, Comcast blames its payment processing vendor</li>
<li>Inaccurate records (NI Water)</li>
<li>Unintended back-office error (Contact Energy)</li>
<li>Complexity - for example "We’re sorry that the complexity of the changes we made caused
confusion. We’re now doing all we can to improve our communication with
customers." (Npower)</li>
</ul>
<br />
These blunders might be cited as an illustration of organizational stupidity. But when a chief executive says he didn't know exactly what was going on, and tries to pass a dodgy billing scheme off as if it were merely a programming error, I'm not minded to take this apology at face value. Obviously sometimes chief
execs are confused and don't know what is going on, but is this really the explanation for dodgy billing?<br />
<br />
Complexity is often a strategy for ripping off the customer. If you can keep the customers in a state of confusion, then they are unable to make good decisions, and end up paying more than they need. This follows a standard strategy known as the OODA loop, which is used in military circles to confuse the enemy.<br />
<br />
This is how it works. Customers try to optimize their spending, using a technique known as Ninja Shopping, which is a version of the OODA loop - Observe (Prices), Orient, Decide, Act. Companies try to prevent Ninja Shopping by obstructing and obfuscating the orientation phase.<br />
<br />
Obviously there is some embarrassment (plus regulatory hassle and compensation) when these so-called blunders are exposed. But if these companies usually get away with (and profit from) using complexity as a weapon, then there is little incentive to simplify. <br />
<br />
See my post on <a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2008/06/complexity-based-pricing.html">Complexity-Based Pricing</a><br />
<br />
<br />
<ul>
</ul>
Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-71306716083437436562012-04-25T22:16:00.000+01:002012-11-17T17:15:59.080+00:00Size and Organizational IntelligenceWhat’s it like working in an intelligent organization? If you’ve ever worked in a successful start-up, you’ll recognize that there is a real desire to understand what the customers want, and strong commitment to collaborative problem-solving. Meetings are focused on solving real issues, and there is little tolerance for the kind of unproductive games that people play in larger and more established companies. In principle, it should be possible to have this kind of positive experience in any organization: in practice, these aspects of intelligence get rarer as an organization gets larger and older.<br />
<br />
It is a popular idea that large organizations should behave like small organizations: one way to achieve this is to look at the way successful small organizations practise organizational intelligence.
Let us start by asking whether it is NECESSARY to sacrifice the good things about small organizations to become a big one? And if not, why does it often seem to happen?<br />
<br />
Small startup companies often need to mobilize high levels of organizational intelligence. One reason may be a self-reinforcing narrowness of scope that forces a tight focus on essentials; small companies have very limited resources they can't afford to squander. Therefore the founders and early employees scan the environment keenly and solve problems collectively.<br />
<br />
As the company grows in size, it may lose some of this keen intelligence. Customer situations recur, and many of the day-to-day problems have been solved, so the challenge becomes simply efficiently repeating known solutions to known problems.
Meanwhile, the immediate and intensive communication and coordination enjoyed by small teams gets attenuated as the organization grows. Workers still spend large amounts of time communicating with their colleagues, but the critical flows of information are more indirect and may suffer interruption, distortion and interference.<br />
<br />
Because of these factors, large companies often display
a number of pathological characteristics.
For example: forced diversification to keep growing; geographic expansion and timezone issues; competitors start to see you as a threat; regulators get interested in you; new people join with their own agendas.<br />
<br />
...<br />
<br />
<br />
<hr />
Extract from new book on Organizational Intelligence by Richard Veryard. Available at <a href="http://leanpub.com/orgintelligence/">http://leanpub.com/orgintelligence/</a>Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-82193454880471235932011-10-26T15:20:00.000+01:002012-12-17T02:26:30.106+00:00The consequences of Lean at BPIn his new book on BP, Tom Bergin blames lean management principles for the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Here is a summary of Bergin's argument, taken from a review by <a class="title" href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n19/mattathias-schwartz/how-fast-can-he-cook-a-chicken">Mattathias Schwartz, LRB 6 October 2011</a>.<cite></cite><br />
<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">The beginnings of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, Bergin argues, can be found in the reorganisation Browne undertook, applying to BP the leaner management principles he learned at Stanford. The company was divided into ‘strategic business units’, independent companies within the company, each of which could allocate its capital and manage projects as it saw fit. Managers were held to short-term ‘performance contracts’ focusing on high production and low cost. Those who could extract the most oil while spending the least money were rewarded with promotions and bonuses. Promising junior executives were shuffled between posts all over the world, rarely staying anywhere long enough to bother replacing outdated equipment or rusting pipelines. ‘Go to the limit,’ Browne told his managers. ‘If we go too far, we can always pull back later.’<br />
<br />
Bergin argues persuasively that such practices amounted to ‘moral hazard’, with BP not quite consciously rewarding the senior employees who engaged in the riskiest behaviour. The cost-cutting continued under Hayward, who trimmed BP of drillers, geologists and other specialists, outsourcing technical tasks to contractors and filling the company’s top ranks with traders who knew how to allocate capital and whip subordinates into meeting the next quarter’s targets. The demands for rapid production and low cost grew even more intense as Hayward instituted ‘stretch targets’ whereby the results achieved by one outperforming business unit were touted as company-wide goals.<br />
<br />
Much the same sort of thing has been going on elsewhere, in manufacturing and retail in particular, since the late 1990s, when a new wave of Taylorism swept through management theory. Under the banner of euphemisms like ‘accountability’, workers’ earnings and job security were linked to ever rising performance goals. For a retailer like Wal-Mart, there were few upper limits on efficiency targets – impossible goals could be passed down the chain of command until ambitious managers felt compelled to lock their minimum-wage employees in stores overnight. But oil and gas extraction were a special case. At the bottom of the production chain were the implacable realities of geology, whose limits could not safely be breached. ‘Thus began a continuous effort to go beyond what BP’s own engineers considered physically possible,’ Bergin says of the stretch targets. One of the most important measurements was raw speed – how fast project leaders could get a hole drilled – calculated in ‘days per 10,000 feet of drilling’. It was as though BP’s senior executives in London had sent their workers into a room full of flammable gasoline vapours with a box of matches and a live chicken, offered prizes to whoever could produce a cooked chicken fastest, then handed the workers safety manuals, closed the door and turned their backs.</blockquote><br />
<br />
<a class="title" href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n19/mattathias-schwartz/how-fast-can-he-cook-a-chicken">Mattathias Schwartz, LRB 6 October 2011</a> <cite></cite><br />
<cite>reviewing</cite><br />
<br />
<ul><li><cite>Spills and Spin: The Inside Story of BP</cite> by Tom Bergin<cite> </cite></li>
<li><cite>A Hole at the Bottom of the Sea: The Race to Kill the BP Oil Gusher</cite> by Joel Achenbach</li>
</ul><br />
See also my post <a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.com/2011/04/black-swans-and-complex-system-failure.html">Black Swans and Complex System Failure</a>.Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-21756469722990980662011-10-14T10:13:00.001+01:002011-10-14T10:18:08.847+01:00Philosophy and Entrepreneurship<a href="http://oxford.academia.edu/RichardPrice">Richard Price</a> is a web entrepreneur, the founder and CEO of <a href="http://academia.edu/">academia.edu</a>. He is also an academic philosopher, with a fellowship at All Souls College Oxford, and is accustomed to being asked about the connections between philosophy and entrepreneurship. In an article in the latest edition of <a href="http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/22995/OPe2011.pdf">Oxford Philosophy Magazine</a> (pdf), he offers the following hypothesis.<br />
<br />
<blockquote>Some people ask me whether there are any connections between philosophy and entrepreneurship. I think there is at least one connection, which is about attitudes towards problem-finding. Problem-finding comes before problem-solving: you have to find and clearly articulate the problem before you can set about trying to solve it. In everyday life, we often zoom along through logical transitions at such speed that we don’t notice minor glitches in those transitions. I think one thing that philosophers do is try to slow those transitions down, so that we are more sensitive to glitches that may occur. After experiencing a glitch, something that doesn’t feel quite right, instead of marching ahead, philosophers will magnify that sensation of something not feeling quite right, in order to see whether there is an underlying problem in the rational transition.<br />
<br />
When looking for business ideas, the analogue is that we often zoom around in life having adapted our behavior so successfully that we don’t often notice the constraints that we are skilfully navigating around. When hunting for business ideas, one has to slow down when one feels that one is navigating around some constraint, and then examine that constraint to see whether it can be removed. This is one of the similarities between philosophy and entrepreneurship for me: in the case of philosophy, one is on the lookout for logical problems with a train of thought, and in the case of entrepreneurship, one is on the lookout for practical problems in a train of activity.</blockquote><br />
I think this answer implies something about the ability to switch logical levels - to think practically about a business problem, but also to think about how one is thinking about the business problem. Reflexive thinking, we might call it.<br />
<br />
Innovation often depends on people finding new answers to questions that most people thought weren't worth asking. For example, when Bill Gates asks "What is a network?", this could either be interpreted to mean that Bill Gates is stupid or alternatively that he is very clever. (Smart money goes with the second of these two possibilities.) See my post <a href="http://rvsoftware.blogspot.com/2010/04/whats-difference-between-judges-and.html">What's the difference between judges and geeks?</a>Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-36141955905071957012011-02-07T10:06:00.000+00:002013-06-06T10:51:38.145+01:00ApprenticeshipThe BBC programme "The Apprentice" gives a highly distorted picture of business and apprenticeship, for the sake of popular entertainment. The programme shows a group of good-looking and confident young men and women being given a series of short tasks by a rather brusque businessman. One candidate is eliminated each week, and the survivor is promised a well-paid but unspecified job by the said businessman. In the BBC version screened in the UK, the role of brusque businessman is played by Lord Sugar, who made a fortune from Amstrad computers and other electronics.<br />
<br />
The programme provides a fly-on-the-wall view of the candidates as they tackle the week's tasks, occasionally intercut with wry comments and face-pulling from the consultants who are employed to supervise them. Viewers imagine that they are getting a rounded and authentic picture of the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate, although we tend to see more of the flashes of idiocy and spite, than the solid and intelligent graft that produces real success. When Lord Sugar announces which candidate is to be fired each week, the viewer may then jump to conclusions about the relative importance of the different strengths and weaknesses as seen, not just in Lord Sugar's mind, but in the mind of any equally successful businessman, and this gives an extremely distorted impression of the characteristics that might be valued more generally in the business world.<br />
<br />
I saw one programme in which the candidates were sent out to sell cheese, and the game was to see which team sold the most cheese in one day. In the real world, that would be a ridiculous way of assessing a person's business ability. If I were in Lord Sugar's position, the candidate I should want to hire would be the one who didn't necessarily sell much cheese on the first day, but went back and sold more cheese the second day, and continued to improve. Surely persistence and determination are far more important than beginners' luck?<br />
<br />
In the present economic climate, there are many bright and ambitious but inexperienced young men and women, who are unable to find jobs that match their abilities and potential. This is a cruel waste. There are also many sectors (fashion, journalism, media, politics) where it seems the only route to a glamorous and well-paid job is to work as an unpaid intern for an extended period. This is unfair (because it tends to favour candidates from affluent families) and open to exploitation (because the interns are donating their labour to already profitable companies with no guarantee of getting anything in return). <br />
<br />
The kind of arrangement I'd prefer is something between apprenticeship and internship, where young people can earn something and learn something and add value for themselves and their employers. Let's imagine a dairy businessman who really wants to find new outlets for his cheese. Let's suppose he employs a couple of inexperienced sales representatives, paying them reasonable commission and expenses, and giving them a fair amount of coaching, mentoring and support. This might be a full-time job, or more likely something that occupies the young person several hours a week alongside other less challenging jobs. Alternatively the coaching and mentoring are provided by retired business people on a voluntary basis.<br />
<br />
Of course there are already some schemes of this kind, but there should be a lot more. I believe many successful small businesses would be willing and able to support such a scheme, and many young people would be eager to participate in such a scheme, which would undoubtedly enhance not only their CVs but their actual business experience. In a few years time, these young people will then form the backbone of the next generation of entrepreneurs. Lord Sugar cut his own business teeth selling cooked beetroot on a market stall. Where is the 21st century equivalent of this kind of experience?Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-73455299648033511552010-10-19T10:37:00.003+01:002012-11-17T23:00:07.607+00:00Psychodynamics of leadership at Microsoft<i>Here's what I wrote in October 2010, on the news of Ray Ozzie's departure from Microsoft.</i><br />
<hr />
<br />
This week's news that Ray Ozzie is leaving his role as Chief Software Architect at Microsoft is being interpreted as a personal failure either for Ozzie himself or for the Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer. Some commentators are saying that Ozzie had not been a satisfactory replacement for Bill Gates (for example suggesting that he couldn't match Gates' ability to bridge business and technology), while others are suggesting that Ballmer is using Ozzie as scapegoat for his own mistakes.<br />
<br />
From a systems perspective, we might ask whether any two men or women, however brilliant, could have satisfactorily performed this divided leadership for an extended period. We might recall that Bill Gates performed both roles himself until 2000, so Ballmer and Ozzie were each being asked to replace one half of Gates. (Stepping into Bill's shoes, getting one shoe each.) We might also note that the Microsoft's share price has been relatively flat since 2000, although it would be wrong to draw simplistic conclusions from this. (For what it's worth, Microsoft's share price fell after the announcement of Ozzie's departure.)<br />
<br />
Where there are two strong figures at the top of an organization, this can produce certain psychodynamic patterns, both functional and dysfunctional. That doesn't mean that shared leadership can never work, but that it doesn't work in quite the same way that sole leadership works.<br />
<br />
<hr />
<i>In November 2012, the focus shifted to Steve Sinofsky. </i><br />
<hr />
My earlier note cited Joe Wilcox's piece, but failed to explore his theme of hawks and doves. Although Wilcox did not name Steve Sinofsy, it now makes sense to classify Sinofsky as one of the Windows hawks Wilcox is talking about. It appears that Sinofsky had successfully battled with Ray Ozzie for control of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Live_Mesh">Windows Live Mesh</a>, and Ray Ozzie left Microsoft immediately after Ballmer folded Windows Live Mesh into Sinofsky's organization. <br />
<br />
See my post on <a href="http://rvsoapbox.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/functional-organization-at-microsoft.html">Functional Organization at Microsoft</a> (Nov 2012), describing Sinofsky's departure from Microsoft and its implications.<br />
<br />
So we get one story if we look at Ballmer versus Ozzie, and a different story if we look at Sinofsky versus Ozzie.<br />
<br />
<hr />
<h4>
Sources</h4>
<br />
Steve Ballmer, <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2010/oct10/10-18steveb-mail.mspx">E-mail to Employees on Ray Ozzie Transition</a> (Microsoft Oct 2010)<br />
Nick Eaton, <a href="http://blog.seattlepi.com/microsoft/2010/10/18/ray-ozzie-leaving-post-as-microsofts-chief-software-architect/">Ray Ozzie leaving post as Microsoft’s chief software architect</a> (SeattlePi Oct 2010)<br />
Joe Wilcox, <a href="http://www.betanews.com/joewilcox/article/Its-a-shame-about-Ray-Ozzie/1287445916">It's a shame about Ray Ozzie</a> (Oct 2010) <br />
Roger Strukhoff, <a href="http://silverlight.sys-con.com/node/1581359">Ray Ozzie, Steve Ballmer, Steve Jobs and The Cloud</a> (Oct 2010) <br />
<br />
Eric McNulty, <a href="http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/11/was_steven_sinofsky_a_brillian.html">Sinofsky Led at Microsoft, but That Doesn't Make Him a Leader</a> (HBR Nov 2012)
<br />
Ashlee Vance and Dina Bass, <a href="http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-12/microsoft-shows-its-windows-chief-the-door">Why Steven Sinofsky Really Left Microsoft</a> (Bloomberg Nov 2012)<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">updated 17 November 2012</span>Richard Veryardhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04499123397533975655noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7426899.post-11430142469227546062010-06-27T16:05:00.000+01:002014-05-06T16:07:45.301+01:00Clockwork or Snakepit?In a classic essay (later included in his book <i>Narcissistic Process and Corporate Decay</i>, New York University 1990), Howard Schwartz distinguishes between two views of organization - clockwork or snakepit (<a href="http://jme.sagepub.com/cgi/pdf_extract/11/2/19">extract</a>). John Darwin later introduced a third view, which he called rainforest <a href="http://www.whb.co.uk/socialissues/jd.htm">Working the Boundaries</a>, (<a href="http://www.whb.co.uk/socialissues/indexvol1two.htm">Social Issues, October 2001</a>).<br />
<br />
<hr />
<h4>
Clockwork</h4>
<ul>
<li>Everyone knows what the organization is all about, and is concerned solely with carrying out its mission</li>
<li>People are basically happy in their work</li>
<li>Level of anxiety is low</li>
<li>People interact and cooperate without friction. Mutual support.</li>
<li>Management problems are easily solved with proper skills and correct techniques.</li>
</ul>
<h4>
Snakepit</h4>
<ul>
<li>Everything is always falling apart. Your first concern is to make sure it doesn’t fall on you.</li>
<li>Nobody really knows what is going on. But everyone wants to know, because there is danger in not knowing.</li>
<li>Anxiety and stress are constant companions.</li>
<li>People deal with one another with little pleasure and considerable suspicion.</li>
<li>Management problems are intractable. Managers feel they’ve done well if they can make it through the day.</li>
</ul>
<h4>
Rainforest</h4>
<ul>
<li>Accept unpredictability and the likelihood of emergence</li>
<li>Search for and discover patterns beneath complexity</li>
<li>Accept fuzziness (and distinguish fuzzy thinking from sloppy thinking!)</li>
<li>Identify and use both positive and negative feedback</li>
<li>Recognise the capacity for self-organisation, and the freedom that must be given to facilitate this</li>
<li>Address the need to develop the organisation’s intelligence and ability to generate knowledge</li>
<li>Recognise codependent arising: the mutually interactive creation of the organisation and its environment</li>
<li>Accept the need for disruptive action</li>
<li>Exercise what the poet John Keats called Negative Capability: the ability to be "in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts”</li>
</ul>
<br />
<hr />
Darwin points out that it is simplistic to regard the clockwork and
the snakepit as two contrasting alternatives. These can be
complementary views, alternative ways of making sense of the same
organization. Darwin regards either/or logic as limited, and uses fuzzy
logic to argue that the clockwork, snakepit and rainforest metaphors all
offer potential strengths for individuals at different times in
organisations and all are limited in certain circumstances.<br />
<br />
Darwin's characterization of three metaphors appears to play the same
kind of categorical function in organizing organizational narratives as
Dave Snowdon's Cynefin framework. I'm not saying they are equivalent, or
that there any simple mapping between them, but merely that they are at
the same logical level.<br />
<br />
<hr />
Cross-posted from <a href="http://demandingchange.blogspot.co.uk/2010/06/clockwork-or-snakepit.html">DemandingChange</a> blog.<br />
See also my presentation on <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/RichardVeryard/sensemaking-presentation">SenseMaking</a>.
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